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HELLER'S GRIDLOCK ECONOMY
IN PERSPECTIVE:
WHY THERE Is Too LITTLE,

NOT Too MUCH PRIVATE PROPERTY
Richard A. Epstein*

This Article critiques Michael Heller's important contribution in The Gridlock
Economy. At no point does this Article take the position that gridlock, or the
associatedanticommons, is not a serious issue in the design of a legal system. But
gridlock is not the major source of social dislocation; nor is private ownership the
major source of gridlock. More concretely, this Article examines the other
important sources of economic distortion that are unrelated to economic gridlock
from private action. These include the use of excessive government subsidies (as
with health care); misguidedgovernment licenses (as with broadcastlicenses); the
unwise use of government power to create gridlock situations (as with employment
law); the excessive role of government permitting (as with real estate
development); and the use of creative private techniques to overcome gridlock (as
with patent licensing as a way to combat the patent thicket). Thereafter, this
Article explains how traditionalcommon law rules did a better job of controlling
for gridlock than many current initiatives, by narrowly defining the class of
actionable harms to exclude competitive loss, blocked views, and hurt feelings. It
closes with an explanation of how broad definitions of harm slow down decisions
in the public sector, thereby impeding the use of the eminent domain power that
could otherwise respond to gridlock issues.
INTRODUCTION
The topic of this conference is Michael Heller's provocative new book,
entitled The Gridlock Economy.' The central thesis of the book is that one critical
obstacle to overall social advancement is the fragmentation of property among
private owners that prevents its coherent assembly for projects that are desired by
all but achievable by none. There is no question that, more than anyone else,
Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York
University, the Peter and Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover
Institution, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
*

MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP
1.
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
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Heller has put this topic on the map in its current form, chiefly through two earlier
academic articles which have had immense influence on the field.2 The ability to
introduce into the mature field of law and economics even a single new generative
term, the anticommons on which The Gridlock Economy is based, is a major
intellectual achievement. What makes this accomplishment so noteworthy is that it
now seems obvious-but only after the fact. The question of holdout has long been
on the agenda, but the ability to link this problem up with the issue of
overconsumption of shared resources-or commons-opens up previously
unappreciated avenues for research. We thus know that with any standardized
models, the losses that come from excessive fragmentation of productive assets, or
tragedies of the anticommons, are equal to those which come from the excessive
use of common resources over which there are no clear property rights, or
tragedies of the commons.3 Today, no assessment of complex social institutions
and practices can be undertaken without thinking about its anticommons
implications. Gridlock is here to stay; not only in discussions about traffic, but also
in those about the economy writ large.
But wherein lies the source of this gridlock? Heller's subtitle offers us
one possible answer: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops
Innovation, and Costs Lives. 4 Sometimes, the strong protection of private property
rights is a source of genuine economic stagnation and dislocation. However, any
close examination of the issues reveals one larger truth that lacks the attentiongrabbing character of Heller's title. In most settings, the weak and indefinite
property rights system is the source of the gridlock that he rightly deplores. We do
not need another indignant attack on the vulnerable institution of private property.
We need a greater appreciation of how unbridled government power does just what
Heller says: "wrecks markets, stops innovation, and costs lives."
The purpose of this critique of Heller is to illumine the true sources of the
gridlock problem. In so doing, 1hope to avoid moving to the alternative scheme of
insisting that private property is the "be-all and end-all" of sound, legal regulations
of the economy. Quite the contrary, for many years I have taken the position that
we can identify an optimal mix of private and public property, one that is often
achieved by customary practices that arise out of the countless actions of unrelated
individual persons, but which sometimes depend on state action for reliable
implementation. The fundamental trade-off that has to be made in all cases lies in
balancing the holdout problems that drive the formation of the gridlock economy5
and the exclusion problems that arise under any private property arrangement.
2.
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (discussing its application to patents).
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:
3.
Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-5 (2000) (modeling the formal

"symmetry" between overutilization and underutilization).

HELLER, supra note 1.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 251-78 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, On the

4.

5.

Optimal Mix of Common and Private Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 17, 20 (1994).
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The proper balance cannot be determined in the abstract, but rather requires a close
look at the nature of a particular resource to figure out what system of rights
maximizes the value in using that resource. Stated in this fashion, it becomes clear
that gridlock is only one important piece of the overall puzzle. Gridlock neither
displaces nor subsumes the other institutional or social problems that stand in the
path of efficient resource allocation.
It is important to stress at the outset one assumption that Heller and I
share: we both think that, by and large, competitive markets offer the best hope for
social prosperity and technological advancement. That is why his indictment
insists that too much ownership "wrecks [competitive] markets," which are, by
implication, a good thing. Indeed, Heller is surely correct in thinking that a need
for efficient and responsive markets generates a grim view of the holdout problems
that arise when property rights are configured in ways that do not facilitate high
rates of transactions, relative to transaction costs. It is therefore appropriate to
begin this Article with a recapitulation of the reasons to fear gridlock in social
relations.
Once the reasons to fear gridlock are presented, however, it is necessary
to put them into perspective, for Heller overplays their severity. More concretely,
Heller makes at least five interrelated mistakes in The Gridlock Economy. He tends
to either downgrade or ignore other sources of distortion in the economy. First, he
ignores the free-fall economy that arises from unwise government subsidies that
produce extensive economic distortions. Second, he tends to misclassify issues as
gridlock problems when their genesis lies elsewhere. In this instance, the chief
error comes in his account of the evolution of property rights in the broadcast
spectrum. Third, he ignores key situations where government power is used to
create gridlock, not end it. Employment relations, in both nonunion and union
contexts, are the dominant source of this problem. Fourth, he tends to ignore the
dangerous role that excessive government permitting plays in throttling effective
economic development. The use of natural resources such as land and water, for
example, suffers grievously from such permitting. Lastly, even when gridlock does
occur due to some distinctive configuration of private property, Heller underrates
the tools that are available to control that risk. Intellectual property law offers
some instructive illustrations.

I. WHY GRIDLOCK?
Early on in The Gridlock Economy, Heller sets out, complete with a map,
the gridlock that developed with respect to transportation over the Rhine River
during the late Middle Ages. 6 Rivers were, as a matter of both Roman and
common law, common property to which all had access and over which no one
person could exercise dominion. The logic behind this was that the value of the

6.
HELLER, supra note 1, at 3 & fig. 1.1.
7.
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 2.1.1-5 (J. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913) ("[A]II of
these things are by natural law common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently,
the shores of the sea."). This persists to the modem day in the doctrine of the navigation
servitude. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES

308-13 (2007).
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river lay in its "going concern" as a river in which multiple, simultaneous uses
were possible, only one of which was private consumption. One of the desired uses
was transportation down the river, which requires property rights of a sort-"rules
of the road"-that allow traffic to move efficiently in a crowded space. But, in
early times, letting anyone use the river maximized its value for transportation,
especially when the use levels were sufficiently low that crowding and pollution
did not require public expenditures. The elaborate construction of toll stations
along the Rhine River was a mortal threat to commerce along the river. But it is
critical to note that they were not created by private action, nor validated by any
conception of private or customary law. Rather, the proliferation of tollbooths laid
in the fragmented state of political power in Germany at the time, which was
controlled by local princes, not a single national government. 8 Indeed, in medieval
times, the distinction between the prince as owner of property and as sovereign
was not as clear as it has become today. But it is clear that all gridlock along the
Rhine must be chalked up to the high politics of rival sovereigns, not petty
disputes of rival owners. The point is evident from the Treaty of Westphalia,
which identifies the relevant parties in its full title: "Treaty of Westphalia: Peace
Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their
Respective Allies." 9 The successful political resolution under the Treaty of
Westphalia, moreover, unlocked the use of the Rhine to support extensive
commercial traffic by resorting to the customary law that preceded government
interventions, which is evident from the Treaty's own language: "and the antient
Security, Jurisdiction and Custom, such as have been long before these Wars in
use, shall be re-establish'd and inviolably maintain'd in the Provinces, Ports and
Rivers." 10
A simple game-theoretical evaluation provides some estimation of the
undeniable magnitude of the gridlock problem. Each sovereign acts on its own
initiative and cares only for its own well-being. Putting a tollbooth across the
Rhine allows it to raise revenues that it could not collect if it just let the traffic go
by.l' It also cuts down on the volume of the traffic, so that overall use of the river
is lower than it was before. The individual duchy or potentate, moreover, does not
take into account any impact that the loss in traffic will have on upstream and
downstream owners. These parties, of course, have the same option as the original
party; they can each put a tollbooth across the river and charge fees. Each party, in
turn, gains from its action but inflicts costs on others of greater magnitude. There
were thirty toll bridges or so across the Rhine. Suppose each one would allow an
owner a one-time increment to income from his own toll operation of 15%, but
expose all other castle owners to a 5% loss of existing stock so that in the end,
Roy Gardner, Noel Gaston & Robert T. Masson, Tolling the Rhine in 1254:
8.
Complementary Monopoly Revisited 2-6 (Ind. Univ. Discussion Paper, 2002), available at
http://www.indiana.edu/-workshop/papers/gardner_ 102802.pdf.
Treaty of Westphalia, Holy Rom. Emp.-Fr., art. LXIX, LXXXIX (Oct. 14,
9.
1648), availableat http://avalon.law.yale.edu/I7thcentury/westphal.asp.
Id. art. LXIX. The Treaty itself explicitly prohibits tolls in two sections. See
10.
id. art. LXIX, LXXXIX.
1ignore alternative gains that could have been captured by selling goods and
11.
services to the river traffic.
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each party gets 0.15 - (29)0.05, which measures the loss from a 5% decrement on
29 repeat plays, for an overall loss to each player of 1.3, which sums to a total loss
for all 30 players of 39 units. It is clear, even without the math, that the cumulative
loss leaves all owners worse off after the game has run its course than if no tolls
had been imposed at all. After all, each blockader would find it impossible to ship
its own goods any distance along the river. So we have an n-person prisoner's
dilemma game in which defection triumphs when cooperation is desperately
needed.
There is, however, nothing about the basic problem that depends upon the
physical configuration of this or that river. Modem markets also have complex
distribution chains, and it is more than coincidence that in these settings we speak
of upstream and downstream parties. The reasoning is the same as with the Rhine
example. If each party holds a monopoly position over its stage of production, the
effort to extract sequential monopoly rents leads to a virtual shutdown of the entire
market because of the cumulative impact of successive noncooperative behaviors.
Technically speaking, these conditions generate what is termed a doublemarginalizationproblem. The math is not important, but the consequences are.
Even just two sequential monopolies can result in huge social losses, relative to a
single monopoly. Additional stages of potential blockade further compound the
problem. However, the economic response is one of vertical integration, whereby
multiple finns become one. At that point, both the monopolist and the consumers
are better off than they were before. Put another way, whenever the factors of
production are arrayed in series (one after another, like electrical circuits), the risk
of blockades requires some kind of collective response. The greater the number of
parties, the greater the risk that is faced.
The increase in the number of parties takes on a very different
significance when the parties do not operate in series like the castles on the Rhine,
but in parallel, such that each one becomes a substitute source of production or
service to the others. Now, the correct response is "the more the merrier." To see
how this works, assume that the only question is how to get from one side of the
Rhine to the other. Assume further that these same castles each control one bridge
over the river. Now, the closer the proximity of these bridges and the greater their
number, the more efficiently the market operates, because each bridge offers an
additional substitute for the others. The only locational advantage that one bridge
has over another is the differential cost of transportation from any given location to
any given bridge. It follows that the calculations made above go into reverse. Now,
the greater the number of bridges, the more competitive the market. There is, of
course, no duty to compete, but with free entry we should expect a realization of
all the gains obtainable from expanding the range of market options. Gridlock
poses problems that competitive markets solve, but everything depends on how the
resources are arrayed.

II. THE FREE FALL ECONOMY
Gridlock may be one important problem, but it is not the only impediment
to the sound operation of competitive markets. A second distortion in markets
comes not from paralysis, but from excessive consumption wrought by
unprincipled subsidies doled out by government agencies. This problem is best
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understood as the inverse of a gridlock problem. Far from being caught in a traffic
snarl, the "free-fall economy" runs downhill at ever-greater speeds without the
benefit of the brake normally supplied by the price system in a well-functioning
market. The normal competitive processes are distorted by government
intervention reducing the costs of production. The result of this subsidy is
excessive production of certain goods, at least until the market collapses when the
extra demand is no longer sustainable.
The instances of this mistake are not insignificant. Consider just three:
Medicare and Medicaid, the ethanol fiasco, and the subprime crisis. The most
salient feature about Medicare and Medicaid is their inexorable increase in costs,
which is hardly a sign of a blockade tying up needed health care resources. Rather,
the age-old question is how to limit demand for goods sold at or near a zero price.
Medicare generates this problem in how it prices goods to eligible members, who
typically must be over sixty-five years old. To be sure, there are some modest fees
for access to medical services, but these are insufficient to cover the entire cost. In
the case of Medicare Part B, the enrollee's fees for professional services cover
about 25% of the total bill, which implies a huge subsidy.1 2 Worse still, the
program is structured as a lump sum payment, independent of age and risk, so that
the marginal cost for additional units of medical services is close to zero. Using
non-price techniques to ration care-limiting the choice of physician and blocking
access to certain types of treatment-generates a huge public uproar, so that the
various short-term reform strategies of cost containment are quickly overwhelmed.
Gridlock is not the issue-free-fall is.
Similarly, the huge booms and busts in the ethanol markets are not a
function of gridlock. Their occurrence is a function of the free-fall economy driven
by large subsidies for using ethanol as a fuel. These subsidies have distorted
international trade markets, as American producers have been largely successful in
getting Congress-that paladin of free markets-to impose heavy tariffs on foreign
importation in order to preserve a free field to American producers. 13 It is unclear
whether Heller classifies tariffs as an element in gridlock. Regardless, the resultant
malaise is surely not the consequence of "too much ownership." However
classified, tariff protection from foreign competition has led to systematic
4
shortages in the grain supply used for food in the domestic and export markets before the sector was devastated in the financial meltdown which had its origins in
the subprime crisis.
12.
"This 25-75 [coverage] ratio ... applies generally to persons who enroll in
Medicare Part B to get coverage of doctors' fees, diagnostic tests, and other outpatient
services." Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious Promise of PostEmployment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 287, 345 (2009) (citing
2009 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 6.02[C][l], at 6-10 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr.
eds., 2009)).
For a critical take on the politics, see Kevin Allison & Stephanie
13.
Kirchgaessner, From Hope to Husk, FiN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at 9.
For impacts of the increased production of biofuels on the food crisis, see
14.
Rising Food Prices: Policy Options and World Bank Response,

WORLD BANK

(2008),

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/risingfoodprices-backgroundnoteapr
08.pdf
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The subprime financial crisis, and its massive aftermath, is yet another
illustration of the free-fall economy. The episode did not start with paralysis in any
observable market. The flow of transactions was high, as brokers knew, all too
well in fact, how to arrange for loans and sell properties. However, they and their
customers respond to incentives, including the large infusion of cheap money that
the Federal Reserve pumped into the market, and to the constant insistence by
Congress that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee loans to high-risk borrowers
who lacked the resources to repay. Cheap money allows people to bid up the price
of housing to unsustainable levels until no greater fool can be found, at which
point the market collapses like a house of cards.15 To be sure, cheap money and
imprudent government guarantees do not account for all the failings of the
financial system. Indeed, the unprecedented level and complexity of securitization
of these subprime mortgages could easily have added fuel to the fire by creating a
crisis in valuation once the bubble burst in the underlying assets. The resulting
distress is plausibly linked to mark-to-market (or, to accountants, "fair-value")
valuation techniques, which involve periodic reevaluation of unsold assets to
market prices. In all, these techniques may have generated the downward cascades
that overwhelmed all the (marginal) protections that the investment banks built
into the initial financial models.1 6 However, regardless of how one treats the
various valuation techniques for these assets, gridlock was not the source of
distress. Put otherwise, excessive volatility can be as deadly as excessive
stalemate. To talk about the one without the other is to deny the complexity of
what really goes on in the economy as a whole.

III. INSUFFICIENT PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE BROADCAST SPECTRUM
Aside from ignoring the major issues discussed above, Heller also
misclassifies as gridlock problems matters that are better treated under other
rubrics. The chief illustration of this problem is his analysis of the broadcast
spectrum, which has been subject to inefficient allocation over its entire history. In
dealing with this issue, Heller makes the bald claim that "[o]ver 90 percent of
[airwaves are] dead air because ownership of broadcast spectrum is so
fragmented."' 17 The factual predicate is true (or at least true enough), as is evident
from a graph of spectrum utilization, which shows steep peaks of intensive use
interspersed with areas of virtually no use at all.' 8 The obvious resource loss in this
scenario is the underexploited portion of the spectrum which, if put into private
hands through auction, is worth billions of dollars. The question for Heller is how
See, for an account, JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How
15.
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 1-14 (2009), with graphs depicting the reduced housing supply if the
"Taylor rule" on money supply had been followed.
16.
For my view, see Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Marking to
Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the Foundations of Capitalism, 36 J. CORP. LAW
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=
1385382.
17.
REG.

HELLER,

supra note 1, at xiii.

For discussion, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22
18.
242, 248 fig.I & n.28 (2005).
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to squeeze this manifest resource failure into his gridlock model. Unfortunately,
that cannot be credibly done. Far from fragmented ownership, the spectrum has
one owner-the wrong owner-the United States.
To see how this came about requires some historical account of the rules
that govern the acquisition of property rights under a private and public law
approach. The common law and Roman law approaches both start with this
obvious limitation: there is no state, as such, which can confer to particular
individuals title to that which is unowned in the state of nature. I have already
indicated that with respect to mixed commons (like water, with both collective and
private uses), the customary legal solutions all placed limitations on the ability,
first of riparians, and then of other individuals, to extract water from the river. In
those contexts, taking initial possession was the only way to reduce water to
private ownership, but there were clear customary limits on the amount of water
that could be removed from the river by that technique. With respect to land,
animals, and chattel, those limitations were removed so that the acquisition of a res
nullius, or an ownerless thing, went to the first possessor who was vested with
ownership rights from top to bottom, i.e., from the center of the earth to the
heavens, or ad coelum et ad inferos. 19 The key feature of these rights was that they
carried not only the right to exclude, but also extensive rights of use and of
disposition. Use rights confer value and alienation rights allow the asset to move
from low- to high-value uses by a variety of techniques-from outright sales, to
partial sales (measured either by space or time), to joint ventures.
The initial system of property rights thus built in a dynamic element that
allowed for the voluntary reconfiguration of rights in light of new technical
possibilities and market opportunities. Much of the common law in these
circumstances facilitated exchange by the use of deeds and recordation that firmed
up the transaction between the parties and gave notice to the rest of the world. 20 It
is this system of transfer that can, on occasion, lead to excessive fragmentation.
Heller explores this capacity in the context of an inheritance regime that treats the
next generation as tenants in common with the whole-a practice that often
reflects the limitations of familial or tribal concerns.2 1 It bears noting that in these
contexts primogeniture is often a successful strategy that concentrates effective
land management skills in the eldest son. But the true effectiveness of that strategy
is measured, in part, by the ability to impose charges, secured by the property for
the benefit of other children who therefore receive financial support even though
they do not retain a control interest in the property. It is only with the proliferation
of multiple interests in land that these sharing arrangements can be achieved
without debilitating compromises in control. Other types of arrangements may be
needed to structure complex commercial ventures that are not subject to the
equitable constraints that control the distribution of wealth within the family, and
19.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that
ownership of a wild animal goes to its first possessor); Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa.
1895) (recognizing a right to exclude subsurface encroachment of only a few inches).
20.
For my view of the increased freedom offered by recordation of servitudes,
see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1353, 1355-56 (1982).
21.
HELLER, supra note 1, at 122-27.
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these too are only made possible by property regimes that organize divided
interests in land.
As applied to the broadcast spectrum, the first question is whether the
system of land rights (which extends to the skies) is sufficient to blockade any and
all use of the overall system. In practice, everyone who faced this problem before
Heller agreed that landowner blockades of spectrum transmission or air travel was
a dead social loser.2 2 So the question was how best to avoid that result. The usual
rule was to "redefine" the property rights so that they extended only to the level of
effective occupation from the ground, and no higher. 23 That redefinition strategy,
however, carries with it real costs in that it paves the way for other arbitrary state
redefinitions that might not prove to be so socially beneficial. Therefore, in this
potential gridlock area, it is correct to create a distinct set of spectrum rights, but
with a test that is more restrictive of government power than simply an assertion
(though correct) of overall social gains.24 The key point is to add a distributional
inquiry: Does the redistribution of rights reduce the net worth to the individuals
who are subject to the new legal regime? With respect to air traffic and spectrum
use, the overall gains are so massive and so reciprocal that it is hard to see how
any landowner who is denied either a holdout right or a cash compensation right is
worse off with those uses than without them. Other forms of property redefinition
cannot meet this distributional standard, and for them the case for cash
compensation is, in general, far stronger.
Thus far, the analysis of the spectrum shows that one technique for
blocking private gridlock is the judicious use of an eminent domain power, whose
just compensation requirement may be satisfied by the in-kind benefits that are
given to landowners.25 However, even where a state taking is justified, there is still
the question of how to allocate the spectrum use among various players once that
use is freed of ground-owner constraint. The common law private property
solution is an imitation of a first possession rule, which allows spectrum rights to
be claimed by the first user of that particular (fuzzy) band. There was some
nascent movement toward this bottom-up system in the radio frequencies during
the early 1920s, including the well known Oak Leaves case that explicitly built on
the common law analogies. 26 The virtues of this system cannot be easily

22.

This idea is illustrated by the early case law on flight-path trespasses. See,

e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (calling it "utterly
impracticable" that "the law should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or assert
claims to definite, unused spaces in the air").
Id. at 758-59; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (stating
23.
that one's ownership extends to "the space above the ground as he can occupy or use [it] in
connection with the land").
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW To REVIVE
24.
CONSTITUTIONAL

PROTECTION

FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY

26-34 (2008) (discussing the

implications of social contract political theory for legitimization of government projects and
the required distributional constraints).
The in-kind benefit comes in the form of restrictions on the property rights of
25.
others, providing parallel and reciprocal benefits. Id at 49-50.
Chi. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926), reprinted
26.
in 68 Cong. Rec. 215-19 (1926) (recognizing rights in spectrum acquired by application of
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dismissed; nor should they be unduly romanticized. The key advantage of this
system is that it allows for the creation of a robust set of ownership rights that
permit effective deployment and use. The obvious problem is with user
interference across signals, resulting in lower transmission quality, to which there
are several possible responses. The first is that the frequencies can be effectively
spaced, as each new entrant tries to create distance between him and his neighbor
to minimize that risk. The implicit assumptions behind this model are, first, that
the entries are well spaced so as to let parties establish priority of entry-an
assumption that fails when modem technology allows for the instantaneous
occupation and utilization of spaces and forces the use of auctions to privatize the
spectrum. The second assumption is that there is a limitation on the amount of
bandwidth that can be taken by each occupier and a limitation on the number of
frequencies that each can take. The third assumption is technological, namely that
the use of more efficient transmission devices can be used to pack more and more
information into narrower bands, which would reduce interference.
This early system for broadcast licenses did not last, in part because of the
interference problem, which intensified during the rush to establish priority rights
and led to the passage of the 1927 Radio Act.27 The Act established the Federal
Radio Commission, which leveraged the physical interference problem into a
comprehensive system of government licenses to all players, even those who had
perfected their common law title under the first possession system. This maneuver,
therefore, removed private ownership as a means of allocation for the broadcast
spectrum, and led to the adoption of a complex administrative system based on
"public convenience, interest, or necessity., 28 This language was construed in
grand style, which led to this colossal miscalculation by Justice Felix Frankfurter,
who styled himself as the sophisticated opponent of naYve market solutions:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of
radio communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission
as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent
stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not
restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts
upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of
that traffic. The facilities of radio are not large enough to
accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised
for choosing from among the many who apply. And since Congress
itself could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission.
The Commission was, however, not left at large in performing
this duty. The touchstone provided by Congress was the "public

interest, convenience, or necessity," a criterion which "is as concrete

the resource to productive use, essentially converting priority in time to priority of right, and
drawing on water rights models).
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed or merged
27.

1934). For an account of the events leading up to its passage, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Oak
Leaves and the Origins of the 1927 Radio Act, 95 PUB. CHOICE 277, 278-84 (1998).
28.
Radio Act, § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163.
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as the complicated29factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit.,
The many failures of the FCC in buckling down to the task that Justice
30
Frankfurter assigned it have been well documented. No one could have ever
expected this so-called "touchstone" to provide serious guidance on frequency
allocation within the radio band. The want of ownership rights, and the
consequence of inefficiency within the band, cannot be attributed to "too much
ownership." They are attributable to the want of any private ownership system at
all. The problem is administrative overreaching, not overlapping and conflicting
property rights. Frankfurter's notorious "touchstone" may be sufficient under
current administrative law to permit the delegation of legislative authority to
3
administrative agencies. ' Operationally, however, it is too vague to supply any
guidance for intelligent decisionmaking. Furthermore, the technical conditions
attached to licenses dictate the kinds of equipment that the licensee must deploy,
which often strips the allocated frequencies of much of their value. Indeed, one of
the problems in this portion of the spectrum is not gridlock, but localized
underutilization borne from direct regulation. A bandwidth for radio or television
allocated fifty or sixty years ago is now more than ample for its original purpose.
A private owner would keep some portion of the band, and license, lease, or sell
the remainder to some noninterfering use in order to squeeze more value out of the
frequency. However, that cannot happen when state licenses require the
government to authorize multiple uses, which governments will find difficult to
issue in any politically charged environment. The result is waste through
government intervention, precisely because there is no private property system to
act as a counterweight.
The use of state power explains some of the implicit inefficiencies in the
use of the highly occupied spectrum, but it cannot explain the relative idleness of
huge portions of the spectrum today. Gridlock, however, offers no explanation
either. The key decisions were all made as early as 1912, when the United States
government made its initial spectrum allocation (free of all ground-owner
concerns) by administrative fiat with, at best, a partial appreciation of the future
evolution of the system. 32 The Navy, therefore, came out very well because it was

Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943) (quoting
29.
Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44 Stat. at 1163, and Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940), respectively).
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
30.
EcON. 1, 8-9 (1959); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 141-43 (1990).
Such was the ultimate holding of National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at
31.
225-26, though the language in question was by then part of the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, into which the surviving parts of the 1927 Act
were merged. For a broad delegation, see, for example, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 420 (1944) (upholding the Office of Price Administration's power to "stabilize" prices
and to prevent "speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal" price increases (quoting
Emergency Price Control Act, § l(a), 56 Stat. 23 (1942))).
The Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, required that broadcasters have licenses
32.
from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The history can be found in THOMAS G.
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uses.
easy to see that it would have extensive ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship
Similar allocations were made to other forms of government use, including public
health and safety, which are, as Heller notes, both primitive and unreliable
precisely because they are government operated.34 These initial 1912 allocations
proved wildly incorrect, and became more anachronistic with each passing
generation.35 It is not that we have gridlock among private property owners. It is
that we have nontransferable government rights. The incomplete "propertization"
of the spectrum has led to public gridlock.

The same can be said of the FCC efforts to create areas of unlicensed
spectrum, where parties rely on self-help devices to prevent the usual kind of
interference clutter between adjacent radio signals. There is an extensive technical
dispute as to whether this system of unlicensed low frequencies allows for more
intensive utilization than the alternative system that allocates a portion of the
spectrum to a single owner who can then decide whether and, if so, which rights to
36
permit, perhaps at lower rates. Ultimately, if the unlicensed spectrum is
inefficient it is not so much because of gridlock. It is because of interference
externalities that could be eliminated by allowing single owners to regulate defined
portions of the spectrum at some positive price.

IV. THE GOVERNMENT CREATION OF GRIDLOCK:
LABOR MARKET REGULATION
Heller's third key mistake ignores the positive role that the government
has taken in creating gridlock in otherwise competitive markets. Competitive
markets work well not because they are instantly and always in perfect
equilibrium. Rather, they do so because of the activities of transactors on each side
of a market, examining the choices open to them on the other side. It is easy,
therefore, to defend a legal regime that seeks to prevent the combination of parties
on either side of the market that would reduce the available choices on the other.
This notion is clearly expressed in antitrust law, which regards horizontal efforts to
fix prices or to divide territories as per se violations of the law, given their adverse
social consequences. 37 Alternatively, a single monopolist may raise the price of
KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS

A.

POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5-12

(1994).
33.
34.

KRATrENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 6-7.

HELLER, supra note 1, at 83.
Thomas Hazlett argues that, contrary to the "error theory" advanced to
35.
explain the failure of the early allocations, the chosen regulatory approach was actually a
self-interested move to maximize rents for influential constituencies. Hazlett, supra note 30,
at 134. There is nothing that says different factors had identical weights at different times.

See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
36.
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 27-36 (2002) (critiquing a property rights approach and suggesting
open networks to optimize capacity). For a comprehensive account of the spectrum
management choices, see Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum
Commons, 74 FORDHAM. L. REv. 663 (2005).
37.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding
horizontal allocation of territories per se illegal); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927) (finding horizontal price-fixing agreements to be, in themselves,
unreasonable restraints on trade and therefore illegal).
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goods or services above the competitive level, which in turn will reduce the total
level of social welfare by blocking transactions for mutual gain that would be
completed in a competitive market somewhere between the competitive and the
(higher) monopoly price.
This stylized account of antitrust law is not concerned with gridlock
issues. The single monopolist has every motivation to reduce transaction costs in
order to maximize his gains. The only modest source of difficulty for the
monopolist is the choice between a single-price or multiple-part pricing schedule
(where the quality of goods remains constant) in order to reach both high and low
demanders simultaneously. 38 This difficulty, however, is not qualitatively greater
than similar pricing issues that can arise in competitive markets, where differential
costs of providing service can easily require differential pricing in order to prevent
the cross-subsidies that can drive some desirable customers from the market. In
addition, they must find out ways to allocate the oint costs of production between
two or more goods for which demand may vary.
The risks of gridlock are vastly increased by the formation of bilateral
monopolies that raise transactional difficulties not found in heavily cartelized
markets. One of the great "achievements" from the New Deal and forward has
been the unerring ability to convert efficient competitive markets into inefficient
regulated markets, where the gridlock issues-here measured by the increased cost
of negotiations, plus the risk of strikes and other breakdowns-become paramount.
We can thus identify an important class of cases of government-sponsored
gridlock.
These pro-gridlock policies stand in instructive contrast to the common
law preference for at-will type contracts, whereby a worker could be fired for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. 40 Dismissal could be accompanied by a
severance package computed by a simple formula. And it was paired with the
right-still respected today-of the employee to quit for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all. 41 The rule was only a default provision, subject to contractual
adjustments on such matters as severance pay, which were often designed to
prevent strategic quitting that could disrupt firm production. Indeed, one of the
soundest (and most reviled) decisions of common law courts was to allow an
For example, consider the movie theater ticket pricing strategy to charge less
38.
students in order to capture these price-sensitive segments of the market
and
for seniors
without sacrificing the high prices charged for general admission.
Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J.
39.
ON REG. 1, 8 (2002) (demonstrating how shared costs can bring about price discrimination
even from firms without market power).
For my defense, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
40.
51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947, 951-53 (1984). For the common law example, see Payne v. Western
& Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884) ("[M]en must be left, without interference to buy
and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for good cause or
for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It
is a right which an employe[e] may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the
same cause or want of cause as the employer."), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v.
Waters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
Epstein, supra note 40, at 954, 973-74.
41.
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employer to bring an action against a union for inducing breach of the yellow dog
contract, whereby the worker agreed not to join a union so long as he remained on
the job.42 The point was to use tort principles to back up contractual arrangements.
Suits against individual workers who quit were likely to prove a transactional
nightmare, although they were not unknown. 43 Yet the great advantage of using the
tort action of inducement of breach of contract against the union was that it could
enjoin activities to recruit workers into hidden membership (a breach of contract)
before the strike occurred, nipping the gridlock problem in advance. This tort
action offered a powerful method whereby employers could preserve the operation
of a competitive market-which is why it was targeted for extinction first in
England under the Trade Disputes Act of 1906,44 and then a generation later in the
United States through the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. 45 Both statutes gutted a
private tort action that hampered gridlock in the form of strikes.
In the United States, Norris-LaGuardia was only the first step to greater
gridlock. The National Labor Relations Act of 193546 took the issue to the next
level by explicitly displacing competitive labor markets with a bilateral monopoly
prone to gridlock. The NLRA imposes elaborate duties on both sides to negotiate
in good faith with each other.47 It therefore makes the refusal to negotiate an unfair
labor practice. 48 It further prevents individual workers from bargaining on their
own account, so that all negotiations go through the union. 49 The only exit right
left to the firm is bargain to impasse. The stakes for these negotiations are always
high; the risk of strike remains large. Once the system is in place, the employer is
stripped of the ability to make unilateral changes in labor contracts in response to
major changes in conditions. The systematic decline in the automobile, steel, tire,
and other industries can be attributed to this built-in rigidity, which means that all
downward reduction in wages, benefits, and conditions of employment come too
See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 252 (1917) ("The
42.
right of action for persuading an employ[ee] to leave his employer is universally recognized
.).
....
See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 304-08 (1908) (upholding suit
43.
against a labor union which had, among other things, organized mass withdrawal).
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, c. 47 (Eng.). For criticism, see
44.
Charles K. Rowley, Toward a PoliticalEconomy of British Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
1135, 1138, 1142-43 (1984) (discussing the conditions created by the 1906 Act that led to
rent-seeking and broad immunities for unions).
Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 114-115
45.
(2006)). For the influential book that spurred its adoption, see FELIX FRANKFURTER &
NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). For my defense of the yellow-dog
contract, see Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the

New Deal Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1370-75, 1382-85 (1983).
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
46.
§§ 151-169 (2006)).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d). For example, where a collective-bargaining contract is
47.
already in place, the law imposes complex notification requirements to various agencies and
services with potentially burdensome waiting periods. See id
§ 158(a)(5).
48.
§ 159(a) (stating that designated representatives "shall be the exclusive
49.
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment").
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little, too late. 50 Despite this experience, the legislative impulse today is not to
eliminate senseless friction by scrapping this gridlock-prone system. Rather, it is to
51
move in the opposite direction. Thus, the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act,
which thus far has not become law, seeks to stop gridlock by forcing compulsory
"interest" arbitration on an employer that tries to bargain to impasse. That interest
arbitration differs sharply from grievance arbitration, for while the latter seeks to
resolve differences between the parties under an existing collective bargaining
agreement, interest arbitration has as its function the creation of a contract for the
parties who have not agreed to anything. Once the process of contract negotiation
has ground to a halt, government arbitration panels appointed by the Department
of Labor can impose mandatory two-year contracts on both sides by fiat. 52 These
contracts cover every aspect of the terms and conditions of traditional labor
contracts-wages, work conditions, pensions, benefits, discipline, and the like.
Ironically, Heller says not a single word about these legislative tendencies to
abolish private property rights in ways that aggravate the gridlock economy he
rightly deplores.

V. GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK: LAND USE REGULATION
The creation of government gridlock also extends to real estate markets,
which are always more difficult to operate than labor markets because of the
obvious external effects that occur in land use, both in urban and rural
environments. The current system of land use regulation is prone to conspicuous
instances of gridlock that surface at every zoning hearing across the United States.
The all-pervasive nature of the permit and regulation problem in land use markets
shows that this problem is not one of those unobserved gridlock difficulties to
which Heller refers from time to time. 53 The huge public tumults over zoning
hearings give ample evidence of the paralysis that can descend upon the operation
of real estate markets. The current situation is that the government cannot occupy
property or initiate any project unless it is prepared to condemn the land. 54 But,
under current law, its multiple agencies exercise a virtual per se veto power over
every development that does not meet its exacting and often inconsistent standards.
This problem is compounded because the multiple veto points found in zoning
regulations often complicate the task of keeping a project alive, as various
agencies, often backed by an indignant public opinion or community board, chip
away at its economic viability. It need not be this way; the potential solution is a
sensible system of regulation that operates on very different premises. This
See Epstein, supra note 45, at 1402.
50.
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), S. 560, H.R. 1409, 11 th Cong. (2009).
51.
See id § 3(h)(3) (modifying section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, at
52.
29 U.S.C. § 158). I have inveighed against this system in Richard A. Epstein, The Case
Against the Employee Free Choice Act 50-67 (Univ. of Chi. L. Sch. John M. Olin Program

in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 452, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.comsol3/
papers.cfin?abstractid=1337185. I also attack the provisions dealing with employer
resistance during organization drives, and, more importantly, the proposed card-check
voting arrangement that does away with secret ballots in selecting union leaders. Id at 1848.
See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 1, at 2, 67, 187.
53.
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 7, at 1221-22, 1258-59.
54.
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becomes apparent by comparing the current gridlock apparatus to the earlier
common law rules that served to eliminate these costly and corrosive bottlenecks.
A. Common Law Rules
Any system of land use regulation is necessarily more difficult than the
optimal form of regulation for labor markets. In labor markets, the physical
externality issues are unimportant; what matters is whether the markets are
organized in a competitive or regulated form. Not so with land use. To be sure,
everyone agrees that, short of condemnation, landowners enjoy the exclusive rights
of use and development for their property. 55 But on no account do they enjoy the
unlimited rights of use and development of their property, given the twin torts of
trespass to land and nuisance.56 For example, it is clear and nonproblematic that
the ownership of one parcel of land does not allow for the encroachment upon land
owned by another. 57 But the harder cases all involve situations in which the harms
involved do not come from physical entry or encroachment, but through invasion
by smells, soot, vibration, odors, and the like. Every system of property rights of
which I am aware brands these nontrespassory invasions as nuisances, rather than
as trespass. 58 The logic for this is clear enough. As a first approximation, it is
better if no one engages in nuisance-like activities of these types than if everyone
does. The value of two neighboring parcels of land, on average, will both increase
if each owner obeys general nuisance proscriptions. Therefore, no one wants to
move back to a world in which the baseline entitlement of exclusive use confers
unlimited rights of use.
Yet, the physical invasion requirement has a clear negative correlative
that is consistent with the effort to use tort law to maximize the value of two (or
more) adjacent plots of land: various kinds of admitted private harms are not
actionable within the system. Modem economic theory calls these "pecuniary
externalities." The classical law called them instances of damnum absque
injuria-harmwithout legal injury. The root conception of both is that, for harms
in these classes, there is no longer the positive association between the private
right of action and overall social welfare. Rather, the correlation now runs in the
opposite direction in that the private harm complained of, on average, is indicative
of an improvement in overall social welfare.

See id. at 16-18, 393 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2)
55.
("Blackstone referred to property with some hyperbole as 'that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe.').
See id. at 1-15, 23-29, 50-51,410.
56.
See, e.g., Garagosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 1935)
57.
(ordering removal of encroachments); Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895) (ordering
removal of underground encroachments).
See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689-90 (N.C. 1953)
58.
("[Any substantial nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land by any type of liability forming conduct is a private nuisance."). In this
instance, the liability forming conduct was that the defendant oil refinery emitted "noxious
gases and odors" in great quantities. Id.

HeinOnline -- 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 66 2011

20111

TOO LITTLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

These nonactionable harms include, most notably, four kinds of losses.
The first is the blocking of views, which usually can only be prevented by stopping
all forms of construction. As a joint matter, both sides are better off in the ex ante
position if both can build, rather than neither. To let the first builder gain
protections against like construction by others creates a perverse incentive for the
premature development of land. The legal rule that tells the landowner, "do it now
or do it later, as you please, and your rights remain the same, regardless,"
eliminates the need to play such games.
The second kind of nonactionable harms under nuisance law are harms
that stem from a lack of access to another landowner's property. Thus, it is not an
actionable nuisance to fill in wetlands, even if it denies access to the fish or
wildlife that previously used it. 59 Nor is it a nuisance at common law to destroy the
habitat that is desired by some endangered species, given the want of a physical
invasion of the property of another. The point here is not that these habitat uses are
not valuable, but, rather, it is that they are not well-regulated by coercion when the
likely response of a landowner is to destroy or impair a habitat, lest it become a
liability for his own use. The argument in this context is that while it is not
permissible to have one's cattle graze on the land of another, it is permissible to
allow the state to force owners to permit unowned cattle (or birds) to use one's
land, even if it causes harm to the owner's farm animals or structures. It is, on this
view, a nuisance for a landowner to exclude wild animals that want to graze on his
land. (Under traditional views, this grazing would be actionable as a routine case
of cattle trespass.) The government thus forces entry but disclaims liability by
renouncing ownership of the harm-causing animals, disincentivizing landowners
from maintaining such purposes. The better strategy, by far, is to allow the state to
condemn property for habitat protection, or to allow the owner to enter into
voluntary arrangements with environmental groups to preserve the habitat (such as
agreements with oil companies that they will take more care in drilling for oil in
exchange for paying a smaller royalty). Since there are many outsiders who can try
to claim some unique interest in someone else's land, impositions by the public
must be constrained to prevent freezing development in typical gridlock fashion.
The third example of a nonactionable harm in the land use context is
identical to one found in labor markets; indeed, many cases involve an amalgam of
the two. Competitive harms from new entry-a store moving in next door, for
example-are nonactionable, no matter how great the financial losses to the
incumbent. The reason for this rule is that any complete social accounting cannot
limit itself to reckoning only the gains and losses between the two neighboring
parties; it must also look to the position of third persons whom the transaction
impacts. The ordinary nuisance that diminishes the effective use and value of all
land reduces the opportunities of third persons to buy and lease into the system.
The introduction of new competitors into the marketplace has positive effects by
expanding consumer choices. So the negative correlation between private harm

See, e.g., K & K Constr. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 417
59.
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) ("The decision to build a restaurant on land, or a request to fill in
wetlands, does not constitute a nuisance that the government may abate."), rev'd, 575
N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
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and social gain justifies calling those competitive harms nonactionable-in a
conscious and correct refinement of John Stuart Mill's harm principle, which is
otherwise necessarily overbroad.6 °
The fourth set of nonactionable harms includes those in the form of
personal offense taken at what others say or do. Basic First Amendment law takes
the position that the mere aversion one has to the views of another individual or his
expressive practices, no matter how intense, offers no justification for stopping
that individual from speaking or acting as he pleases. 61 The most dramatic
examples of this principle are vituperative speech and flag burning (so long as the
complainant does not own the flag).62 Here, again, we are generally better off with
both kinds of speech than with neither, and are careful to make sure that people
cannot gain rights to control the actions of others by taking undue umbrage at
them. Once again, some emendation of the Millian principle of harm is needed to
slow down the undue expansion of government regulation. It follows from this
principle of offense, therefore, that there is no actionable nuisance for reductions in
property value because individuals of-fill in the name of your least favorite group
of people-have moved into the neighborhood.
In all these cases, the use of the harm principle depends, therefore, upon
an accurate definition of what counts as an actionable or cognizable harm, for
otherwise virtually all unpleasant personal interactions could trigger judicial
intervention. The exception to the principle will swallow the rule unless the
definition of harm that is used in individual cases ties into some social objective,
namely, to increase the overall level of social welfare, which can only be done by
creating, whenever possible, competitive institutions. Competitive harms may be
real to the participants, but they have no positive correlation to social losses.
Indeed, the only substitute for competitive losses is a rigid regime of state
protectionism that uses force to prevent one individual from going into
competition with another. Similarly, as between two landowners, the optimal value
is normally obtainable by allowing each to build within his property lines. If, for
some reason, one party wants to acquire rights to look over the land of another, he
can acquire that right by purchasing a restrictive covenant that runs with the land,
binding and benefiting both sides. Once the class of cognizable harms is correctly
constrained, the area for potential remedial action shrinks as well. At this point, the
central issue becomes the type and timing of the remedies for the class of wrongful
invasions so defined. In this regard, we have to take due notice that the land is
often both permanent and fixed, so that even if one person can sell or lease, his
successor in title will have to face the same problems. It is painfully easy to see
how the operation of a factory that pollutes one area today can continue to pollute
that same area tomorrow. Hence, injunctions, as well as damages (which are
For my discussion of the uses and limits of this principle, see Richard A.
60.
Epstein, The Harm Principle-AndHow It Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995).
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
61.
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.").
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (defacing the
62.
American flag in political protest is a protected form of expression).
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difficult to quantify in any event), have always been available, at least for those
nuisances above a certain low threshold,63 where the risks of holdout are generally
regarded as material.
Timing, however, is equally critical to the type of remedy available. The
law approach postponed the use of injunctive relief until the
common
usual
expected hazard was both imminent and serious. 64 It was considered better to wait,
so long as the damage remedy remained available for any harms that did occur
(these remedies already gave land users and developers one strong incentive to
steer clear of trouble). Waiting to seek an injunction reduces the administrative
costs of the system by allowing most cases to sort themselves out long before any
kind of serious harm occurs. But once the harm becomes imminent, no mercy for
the defendant becomes the appropriate response-one that has the added benefit of
encouraging defendants to steer clear of the line, or to procure the consent of
neighbors for potential injuries before undertaking a project. Thus, the bottom line
is that these rules produce very few, if any, cases of gridlock. The definition of
nuisance excludes the three most common types of harm-blocking views,
competition, and offense-and uses few, strong, and late remedies to deter those
nuisances that remain actionable under the law.
There is, of course, one serious gap in this model that in some instances
requires public intervention. Nuisances come in all shapes and sizes. The private
law system works best when one neighbor pollutes or threatens to pollute his
neighbor. But the system does not work as well when it is unclear which neighbor
will be harmed if a nuisance occurs. It is costly for private parties to band together,
and it is unlikely that one neighbor will sue for the benefit of all. In these
circumstances, the use of public power to enjoin activities is an effective way to
overcome this transactional barrier. But there is one huge caveat that defines this
shift from private to public enforcement: the identity of the plaintiff may change,
but the principles under which either damages or injunctions are issued do not. The
sole reason for the shift is transaction cost reduction, not to give the state expanded
powers that upset the efficient distribution of remedies that were created under this
common law regime.
B. Modern Administration
The modem system of land use regulation has disregarded the above
assumption. Instead, it assumes that once the state gets involved in the case,
neither the narrow definition of harm nor the restricted use of injunctions to cases
of imminent harm matters. Each and every one of the four types of harms excluded
These low-level common nuisances are rendered per se legal under the so63.
called "live and let live" rule on the grounds that the initial presumption is reversed. Both
parties are better off suffering some small nuisance in exchange for an increased freedom of
action. See Bamford v. Tumley, [1862] 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (K.B.); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (1979).
"As a matter of history ... [t]he writ of nuisance, like other early common64.
law actions, provided only for damages. Eventually, landowners complaining of nuisances
could also obtain injunctions from a court of equity, provided the harm was irreparable and
the other conditions for equitable relief were met." MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 7, at 962
(citations omitted).
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from the private law of nuisance thus becomes the proper object of permissible
public regulation. 65 This hugely expanded definition of harm guarantees that the
number of actionable interactions between people will increase, which in turn will
put greater pressure on the remedial side of the system. And when the remedies are
considered, the requirement of imminent harm disappears in favor of some kind of
precautionary principle, whereby the activity in question has to be regarded as
wholly safe before anything can be undertaken.
The current system thus starts with the proposition that blocking views,
preserving habitat, engaging in economic competition, or engaging in activities
that cause offense locally are now all legitimate concerns for regulation for which
no compensation of the affected landowner is required.66 Any new structure that is
built within any community will, therefore, be likely to have profound effects on
large numbers of nearby persons. The permit process is so cumbersome and timeconsuming that it could not possibly be run through the judicial system. So by
default, an administrative approach has to take over regulation, which makes land
use regulation fertile ground for a system of multiple vetoes that defines the
gridlock economy. Typically, this process will be dominated politically by wellconnected persons (often with private agendas) who live in the neighborhood that
abuts the new development. At this point, the aggregation of preferences is a
nightmare because some of the neighbors will get economic, social, or aesthetic
gains from the operation and, hence, will favor it while many others will be
opposed. If the matter ceases to be an up or down vote on the new project, virtually
everyone will have some idea on how to tinker with the enterprise in order to
expand their scope of influence. The local bias will exert its influence on the
timing question. With harms so numerous, the imminence test yields to the
precautionary principle, whether we deal with zoning or environmental protection.
After all, if the problem is that the construction of a new luxury building will alter
the character of a neighborhood, we do not have to wait until it is leased out to see
the peril (or benefit) of that action.67
In response, we frontload the permit process under a full participation
model in which every outsider has his or her say. The public officials or boards
then have veto power over the project, often in layers. The New York City
Uniform Land Use Review Process ("ULURP"), for example, requires, after an
initial certification, a Community Board Review, a Borough President Review, a
City Planning Commission Review, a City Council Review, and a Mayoral
Review. 68 So the new standard requires that you prove that you will not step on
any of the broad interests that are relevant in these cases before you are allowed to
undertake the new project. The permitting process becomes, by far, the single most
important feature of land development. Most new projects must go through
See id. at 1049-52.
65.
See id.; see also id. at 1062-63.
66.
67.
See, e.g., Chinese Staff& Workers Ass'n v. N.Y.C., 502 N.E.2d 176, 180-82
(N.Y. 1986) (holding that the term "environment" was broad enough to cover population
shifts of various sorts).
68.
See Dep't of City Planning, The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP), NEW YORK CiTy, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
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multiple layers of permit approval before construction can even begin, including
dredge and fill permits that are within the province of the Army Corp of Engineers.
And where the federal government leaves off, state departments of natural
resources can pick up the slack. Gridlock personified.
Moreover, once we have objected to the common law approach because
of external effects, nothing says that community harms cannot also arise from the
inside of a real estate project which has, of course, no nuisance-like characteristics.
It is, therefore, common today that we have all sorts of other strictures on new
construction that become veto or choke points for the process. The amount of
affordable (i.e., below market) housing that must be built is now subject to
extensive multilateral negotiations, which must be concluded before construction
can begin.
No one thinks that a higher supply will result in more units at lower
prices. Access for the disabled, especially those in wheelchairs, becomes another
example of a legitimate state interest, such that any project can be slowed down or
stopped if it does not meet stringent requirements, whether or not someone
disabled lives there. 69 Labor relations also matter. Since market solutions were
already rejected in labor cases, it is now fair game to slow down a permit process
if organized labor does not get guaranteed work on the project, for example. And,
of course, there is also no particular reason to refrain from imposing various other
exactions on local developers, not just to handle the increased traffic they bring
into the neighborhood, but also to subsidize the construction of improvements that
benefit existing residents. And from this plethora of permits comes no judicial
relief. Talk to various large-scale developers and they will speak as one. There is
no legal protection. Everything requires a political solution. It is gridlock squared.
The dynamics of this process have one key feature: the systematic
separation of power from responsibility. There is no effective remedy against an
administrator who says he needs to see more documents or needs more time to
review the documents he already possesses. Nor is there any principle of res
judicata that guarantees the approval given one day will stick the next. The basic
rules do not treat permits as vested until final approval is obtained, no matter how
extensive the predevelopment costs undertaken in reliance on administrative
understandings. Litigation, moreover, is not permitted until the administrative
process has been exhausted,7 ° which allows officials to string along everything
even further. It does not take much imagination to see how costs spiral, which in
turn brings in fresh calls for additional subsidies and penalties, which overheat the
market still further. Different kinds of permits, moreover, are administered by
different kinds of groups with different sorts or expertise so that any change in one
dimension could require a redrawing of plans that have to run through the entire
cycle yet again. Gridlock necessarily follows in a permit culture, not from having
too many private property rights, but from having too many systems of oversight
69.
See ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG),
ADA STANDARDS, § 4.1, http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/adaag.htm#4.1 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2009).
70.
Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-96 (1985).
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in search of too many objectives, which leaves too much unfettered discretion in
the hands of public officials who do not have to bear the costs of their own
arrogance or mistakes.
The question then arises as to what tactics could be used to overcome this
problem in the current legal environment. One possibility for overcoming gridlock
is to engage in condemnation of properties needed to create some larger assembly
of land. This approach appeals to Heller, 71 who is keenly aware of how a single
landowner with a strategically held tract can block an entire process.72 But the
eminent domain process is, in fact, highly complex. On the one hand, Heller is far
too sanguine about the operation of the power. He thus defends the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 73 which generated a firestorm of
public protest when private land was taken for the purposes of economic
development under a very broad reading of the "public use" language in the
takings clause, giving the local government complete discretion on what land to
take.' 4 Heller's argument would make some sense if there were some sort of land
assembly process that the Kelo plaintiffs had blocked. But, in fact, this was a
classic illustration of eminent domain abuse because the City of New London had
no idea what it was to do with the land (which five years later still lies vacant), and
at no time needed it in order to complete any of the projects that it had on tap. To
say that "the underlying facts may seem troubling" 75 understates the point a
thousand fold, given that the Supreme Court could have affirmed the ability of the
state to take private lands in order to overcome assembly problems without giving
it carte blanche to roust individuals from their homes in order to get snazzier
buildings in their place. And the situation does not get any better because the
compensation provided in these cases always leaves the landowner worse off than
before by denying compensation for any of the collateral costs associated with
eminent domain, such as litigation costs, appraisal costs, and moving costs. The
eminent domain solution is thus capable of real abuse that leads to excessive
condemnations for no good social reasons.
There are, of course, many situations in which eminent domain powers
are available but cannot be used effectively. And here we see the gridlock problem
in yet another guise. On this point, Heller offers one proposed solution that is
misplaced. In the first instance, he argues that the way to cope with the various
approval processes is through the creation of a system of land assembly districts,
which he claims will "fix gridlock by giving neighbors a say in whether their land
is assembled for economic development," 6 particularly in blighted areas. 7 The
point here is to allow "the neighbors" to decide what land assembly projects
belong in "their community." But the program only adds an additional layer of
confusion to all that precedes it. Many of the most bitter land use disputes take
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See HELLER, supra note 1, at 109-15.
Id. at xiii, 113.
Id. at 117 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89; see HELLER, supra note 1, at 116-17.
HELLER, supra note 1, at 117.

See id. at 119.
Id. at 119-21. For the complete discussion, see Michael Heller & Rick Hills,
Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REv. 1465 (2008).
76.
77.

HeinOnline -- 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 72 2011

20111

TOO LITTLE PRIVATE PROPERTY

73

place where the developer has put together land for a new project by voluntary
means alone. Yet, it should not be thought that "the community" will have no say
in whether that project is completed. Unfortunately, when it does have its say, it
often responds to powerful pressures to say that a development that is needed
78
citywide should be completed, just "not in my backyard" ("NIMBY").
The NIMBY movement gets off to the wrong start when it claims
ownership interests in property-"my backyard"-that is owned by others. Just
deciding where the district lines should be drawn will create major disputes, as
there are sure to be some projects that are located at the edge of one district whose
impacts will be felt by individuals in one or more adjacent districts. Any land
assembly districts will just add another layer of gridlock to the cumbrous processes
already in place. Quite simply, there is no way to fix the gridlock problem unless
we narrow the definition of externality to exclude all the various ills that now
count as protectable harm. Once that definition is narrowed, the eminent domain
process can kick in. Those people who wish to require a builder to redesign his
structure for what they conceive of as aesthetic reasons may do so as long as they
pay the freight. But it is amazing how few soft externalities people care to correct
when forced to tax their community to achieve that end.
In addition, Heller does not fully understand why the eminent domain
process does not work in those cases for which it is needed. For example, no one
disputes that airports and runways often require use of the eminent domain power
for land assembly. Nor does anyone question that taking land for airports is taking
land for public use. For many years, the construction of airports did not generate
huge controversy, even when master builders like Robert Moses79 were known to
trample small people under foot.80 Yet, while Heller reports that since the
deregulation of air traffic in 1975, the volume of traffic has tripled, only one new
airport has been built, in Denver. 81 The explanation, however, is not gridlock from
private ownership, which is counteracted by the capacity to condemn land on
payment of just compensation. Indeed, many jurisdictions have "quick take"
statutes that allow the property to be paid for before the total amount of
compensation is determined, which in some instances is lowballed.82 Rather, it
comes through the operation of the extensive permit system that gives all sorts of
persons, including nonowners of the condemned property, an opportunity to
challenge the location and size of the airport. Those powers exist even if the
designated land is already located in public hands. In some instances, the
objections, which relate to nuisances such as noise and traffic, may be well
78.
79.

MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 7, at 1063.
Paul Goldberger, Robert Moses, Master Builder, Is Dead at 92, N.Y.

TIMES,

July 30, 1981, at Al.
80.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 78.
81.
See HELLER, supra note 1, at xiii.
For an illustration of how complex the compensation process can be for land
82.
that is subject to divided ownership of various sorts, see City of Chicago v. ProLogis, 890
N.E.2d 639 (I11.App. Ct. 2008), aff'd, 923 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. 2008). I have worked as a
consultant to the landowner in this case. For my take on this issue, see Richard A. Epstein,
How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing:The Lessons of ProLogis v. City of Chicago,

77 U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (2010).
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conceived. But in other cases, the protests are done because of all sorts of
collateral motivations. It is thus difficult in these cases to defend the proposition
that huge public projects should be whisked through the political and
administrative process without a close look. But, no matter how the trade-offs
between speed and legitimacy are done, one thing is clear: gridlock from private
ownership is just not part of this knotty problem.
VI. THE PATENT THICKET
The last of the gridlock situations that calls for some examination is the
structure of ownership rights under patent law. The claims for the creation of an
anticommons lie in the assertion that useful pieces of information, particularly
about drugs and drug research, are parceled out among so many rights holders that
it is impossible for diligent researchers to assemble the needed tools and chemicals
for further investigation via voluntary cooperation. In general, there are two ways
to test this claim. The first is to ask whether there are any other explanations for
the decline in new drug innovation. The second is to ask whether, even if those are
put aside, there is reason to believe that the anticommons argument makes a key
difference in this area. I take these up in order.
As with his studies of gridlock generally, Heller overlooks the many other
forces that operate in given fields. Here is not the place to discuss the many woes
of the pharmaceutical industry, but it is important to note that every major policy
shift in the pharmaceutical area in the last decade has reduced the returns to
pharmaceutical investment. I shall just tick them off. First, the pricing end of the
business is under stress. Many foreign nations pursue aggressive monopsony
buying policies that reduce returns. The various government purchase plans
through Medicaid have similar effects in this country, with more to come under the
new Obamacare regime that adds layers of uncertainty to the overall pricing
situation. These activities can be expected to reduce the return to drug companies,
and with it the return for drug innovation." In addition, the costs and complexity
of clinical trials have vastly increased, eroding the protection otherwise available
under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 84 The cost of bringing new drugs to market
includes both the time value of money and the cost of compounds that fail to make
the cut. A full cost estimate from 2003 places that figure at around $1.3 billion per
drug85-a value which has to be recouped during the ten or so years of effective
patent life. 86

83.
Benjamin Zycher, The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The
Medicare PrescriptionDrug Benefit and PharmaceuticalInnovation (Manhattan Inst., Ctr.
for Med. Progress, 2006), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mpr_03.
htm.
84.
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). "[U]nder the 1984 Hatch

Waxman Act, Congress granted patent holders limited extensions of their patent period as a
partial offset to the time lost before the FDA ....

With ever longer periods in clinical trials,

this period does not come close to allowing effective patent use for the full patent term."
EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 160.
85.
See PharmaceuticalPrice Controls in OECD Countries: Implications for
US. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, and Innovation, U.S. DEP'T
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Exposure to liability has also increased with the recent amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") 8 7 and their judicial
interpretation, leaving warnings, however thorough, exposed to the risk of being
upended by state tort actions. 8 Any evaluation of overall levels of drug initiatives
has to take into account these forces, which cut unambiguously against
pharmaceutical innovation.
Yet, suppose we now put aside these issues to concentrate solely on the
gridlock problem as it pertains to pharmaceutical innovation. As mentioned above,
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg made the original version of this claim in their 1998
Science article, which featured their theoretical claim that the anticommons had
thwarted innovation. 89 Their article, however, could be challenged on multiple
grounds. In particular, Heller and Eisenberg did not offer any empirical evidence
of either the nature or extent of the anticommons problem. In The Gridlock
Economy, Heller reports his conversations with an anonymous head of a "Big
Pharma" drug maker who told him "that his lab scientists developed the potential
cure (call it Compound X) [for Alzheimer's] years ago, but biotech competitors
blocked its development." 90
This statement leaves more questions open than it answers.
First, any (anonymous) claim for a potential cure for Alzheimer's has to
be greeted with a grain of salt. That disease is a composite condition, no doubt as
complex to understand as cancer, and for which there is still no magic cure.
Compound X may have helped manage some portion of the disease, but hardly all
of it. Nor does any statement about one firm address the question of whether other
pharmaceutical companies have continued to pursue research in this area. 91 If it
were that kind of blockbuster, the amount of money on the table would surely have
spurred some key players into action.
Second, Heller offers no explanation as to how biotech competitors could
exert this power under the current law. By definition, the competitors are pursuing
alternative approaches to the disease. But what this company needed was the
complementary technologies and compounds not controlled by competitors. Nor is
it clear that, for each stage in the process, there is one and only one compound or
tool that will do the trick. There would be no holdout problem for research
components that were competitively supplied.
30-31 (Dec. 2004), http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/
drugpricingstudy.pdf.
As a result of increased time delays in both clinical trials and the FDA
86.
approval process, "the average useful commercial life today is under ten years, or less than
half the basic patent life of twenty years." EPSTEIN, supra note 24, at 160.
87.
See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA),
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN,

U.S.C.).
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (applying the FDAAA).
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 2.
HELLER, supranote 1, at 4-5.
For some sense of the scope of current research, both basic and applied, see
Networking for a Cure, ALZHEIMER RESEARCH FORUM, http://www.alzforum.org/ (last
visited Sept. 11, 2009).
88.
89.
90.
91.
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Third, Heller makes no reference to the body of empirical literature that
cuts in the opposite direction on this point. In one study published in Science, John
Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley Cohen 92 surveyed seventy attorneys, scientists,
and managers who were active in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Their
research goal was to assemble evidence that indicated the magnitude of the
anticommons problem in biotechnology. The findings, however, revealed that
almost none of the recipients claimed that the current legal patent regime posed
insurmountable obstacles to their research. In both industry and university labs,
researchers adopted strategies of "licensing, inventing around patents, going
offshore, the development and use of public databases and research tools, court
challenges, and simply using the technology without a license (i.e., infringement)"
to achieve their particular goals. 93 A few years later, the verdict was unchanged, as
Walsh and his colleagues reported empirical results that demonstrated that "access
to patents on knowledge inputs rarely imposes a significant burden on academic
biomedical research. 94 In reaching this conclusion, Walsh observed, as Heller
reports, "that 29 percent of recently executed material transfer agreements had
reach-through claims, 16 percent provided for royalties, and 26 percent imposed
publication restrictions. In areas with intense commercial interest, 30 percent of
researchers 95surveyed did not receive the last biological research materials they
requested.,
Heller takes a less sanguine view of these results than did the authors of
the study. He wonders whether it makes sense to move research offshore to avoid
patent claims. 96 My own reaction is that it hardly matters, provided the ultimate
commercial products are brought back. Indeed, I am more concerned about
chasing offshore research through the very exacting domestic standards associated
with animal care and clinical studies. Unlike Heller, I am not particularly
concerned that American patent law does not allow any special research exemption
for the use of patented products.97 There are perfectly good explanations as to why

92.

John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the

Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Working

Through the Patent Problem]. For the longer study, see John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora &
Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS INTHE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285-340 (Wesley M. Cohen

& Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
93.

Walsh et al., Working Through the PatentProblem, supra note 92, at 1021.

John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench:
Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2003 (2005) (reporting empirical
evidence against the Heller-Eisenberg hypothesis). See also Timothy Caulfield et al.,
94.

Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene PatentingControversies, 24 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006).
HELLER, supra note 1, at 66-67 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 94).
95.
Id. at 67.
96.

Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding
97.
there is no experimental use defense to infiringement if "act is in furtherance of the alleged
infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
for strictly philosophical inquiry"). It is instructive that this dispute arose in the atypical
context of a researcher switching universities, not in the context of one research unit using
the patented materials of a second. It therefore suggests that the standard situations where
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that practice is likely to continue in the future. Typically, medical researchers are
not in direct competition with the patent holder insofar as they do not attempt to
sell the patented technology or product on the market. Instead, their research has
positive spillover effects for the patent holder. If it reveals good information, it
allows the patentee to extend sales to new markets. If it reveals bad information, it
allows the patentee to take steps that could avoid costly liability suits, recall
actions, and the like. The empirical evidence could never dismiss all instances of
gridlock, but in the larger picture, gridlock is not a first order question.
Walsh's other findings are consistent with a high level of commercial
activity, which does not suggest gridlock. The use of "reach-through" licenses that
allow the patent holder to collect royalties based on the revenues that a licensee
receives from its licenses makes good commercial sense. One of the greatest
difficulties with scientific research lies in the value of the licensed technology. The
reach-through license avoids the need to make front-end estimates of future
revenues and thus allows for the use of subsequent information to determine
compensation at a later date. Indeed, the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Quanta Computer,Inc. v. LG Electronics,Inc.,98 curbing patent-

holder control of downstream buyers of products embodying their patents, could
easily undercut the flexibility of licensing agreements in ways that could impede
growth.99

Finally, the refusal to give information for free is no surprise in any
commercial context, however common it might, and should, be in connection with
basic research. No firm is required to share trade secrets, and forced sharing
agreements would make it less likely that we would produce the desired
information in the first instance. The empirical evidence, thus, does not support the
view that we have a crisis on our hands that research scientists somehow
overlook.10 0 The same result emerges when viewed from a theoretical perspective.
The story of Compound X takes place against a backdrop in which other firms had
already developed the patented technologies that this company wanted. But why
were those products developed in the first place? Heller is right to acknowledge
that the expansion of ownership rights in patented materials starting with Diamond
v. Chakrabarty'0 in 1980 led to the infusion of huge amounts of investment into
medical research, more generally. 10 2 This illustrates the positive side of the
products by one lab are used in research by another generates no practice obstacles to
development.
553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (holding that Intel's sale to Quanta of products
98.
embodying the LGE patents for which Intel had a license "took its products outside the
scope of the patent monopoly," and LGE could "no longer assert its patent rights against
Quanta").
For my discussion of these points, see Richard A. Epstein, The
99.
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature
Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REv. 455 (2010).
HELLER, supra note 1, at 67 ("[S]urveying scientists just isn't likely to reveal
100.

systematic gridlock.").
447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (holding that the patentee's microorganism was
101.
patentable subject matter, despite that it was a "living" thing).
HELLER, supra note 1, at 60 fig.3.4.
102.
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investment equation; exclusive rights spur innovation. In addition, Heller makes
103
which requires universities that
one brief reference to the Bayh-Dole Act,
warrant it, patenting
circumstances
receive government grants to pursue, if
In
commercialization.
their
toward
view
a
with
products
opportunities for their
general, putting inventions into the public domain should be expected to increase
utilization because no one has to enter into any transactions to utilize that material.
There is ample reason why everyone agrees that mathematical formulae and laws
of nature always fall in the public domain no matter who discovers them. Some
ask, why then use Bayh-Dole to enhance privatization when it necessarily
increases the likelihood of some patent blockade?
It is hard to give a definitive answer to that question, but here is one
possibility. The commercialization of valuable compounds is expensive business.
Once a compound falls into the public domain, each company that seeks to
commercialize it is likely to keep its research activities secret, which means that
other potential participants in this space may be leery about moving into an already
crowded space. On the other hand, when a drug is patented, the firm with the
patent can eliminate one dimension of uncertainty from its calculation. To be sure,
it is only one dimension; no patentee can be certain whether some substitute
technology is in development and subject to trade secret law, or how well
patentees of other products are doing with their research on substitute products.
However, the additional flow of investment dollars into patent research from
Bayh-Dole suggests that there must be at least some force in operation to account
for the spur.1 0 4 Fortunately, in this regard, the narrow decision of the United States
05
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos has eased this tension in the short-run.'
There are, moreover, good theoretical reasons to doubt the claims of
doom that arise in the drug area. Bruce Kuhlik and I have argued that Heller and
Eisenberg fundamentally misconceive the nature of the problem by treating the
context of drug innovation as though it involves the same political dynamics that
are found in permit cultures.10 6 More specifically, Heller's own work refers to the

35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006); HELLER, supra note 1, at 58. See generally
103.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663 (1996) (discussing the
cross currents in licensing practice).
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg note the "unprecedented levels" of
104.
investment and significant acceleration of the patenting trend after passage of Bayh-Dole.
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291-92 (2003). However, Rai and Eisenberg ultimately
worry about the progress of science. Id.
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (making no general statement on patent eligibility).
105.
See Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical
106.
Anticommons?, 27 REGULATION 54, 54-55 (2004); see also F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating
Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith 's Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 106, 108-09 (2007), available at
2

http://www.innovation.hoover.org/media/Fie/KieM/20Coordination%2 Prperty/ Oand
%201P%20at%20117%2OYale%2OLaw%2OJoumal%20Pocket%2OPart/o2l01%20in%202
007.pdf (noting the mechanisms for voluntary exchange, which include simple "freezer"
dispensations of biological reagents at low price).
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corrupt permit system that keeps storefronts empty in Moscow, Russia. 1°7 But
patents generate different incentives. Patent holders are owners of their inventions.
They are not rogue government agents who seek to divert public revenues to
private gains. Their decision not to license to a particular party is likely to be a
profit-making decision, not an invitation to take a bribe. Unlike storefronts, drugs
are wasting assets, disappearing relentlessly over time. Either a firm enters into
deals quickly or it finds itself without a revenue stream. Under such circumstances,
parties work overtime to make sensible alliances dealing with anything from a
single product to an entire line of products. A patent pool, whereby patent holders
agree to license to one another, is, of course, one device that can mitigate holdup
over a wide range of patented technologies. But all patent pools are not created
equal. The current Department of Justice rules make good sense insofar as they are
willing to allow patent pools that contain complements, yet are suspicious of pools
that contain product substitutes, which could become disguised cartelization
subject to the antitrust law. 108
The Department of Justice position is a welcome change from earlier
government activities, which attacked procompetitive pooling arrangements under
the antitrust laws. Consider, again, the different configurations of tollbooths on the
Rhine River. Those that are in series create problems, while those that are in
parallel do not. From the antitrust perspective, merger among different gatekeepers
operating in series should be welcomed, while mergers of different gatekeepers
operating in parallel should be subject to far greater scrutiny. Failure to recognize
that distinction in United Shoe Machinery led to sixty-nine years of nonstop
litigation by the United States against United Shoe, which had merged thirty
different firms who held sequential patents on various stages of the shoe
manufacturing process.' 09 This vertical merger was an effective device to eliminate
a Rhine River problem. Over its lifetime, the merger delivered great efficiencies to
United Shoe's customers, who never complained about the excellent service and
the high levels of innovation, which allowed United Shoe to keep a large market
share. The great achievement of the Department of Justice was to break up the firm
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The major decision in the case was written by Judge Wyzanski. United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). The number of actual

mergers is unclear, but the Government alleged thirty instances of "disabling actual or
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men." Id. at 307. The deadly blow against the firm came in United States v. United Shoe
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see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 301 (2005) (noting the destruction,
and describing the United Shoe decree as "poorly structured"), and Robert W. Crandall,
Costly Exercises in Futility: Breaking Up Firms to Increase Competition 5 (AEI-Brookings
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into unsustainable units just when foreign competition was heating up. 110 The
lesson here is that vertical integration may be a sensible response to the patent
holdup problem, as is free entry of new firms from overseas.
In this regard, moreover, the arrival of new patented technologies should
not be viewed as necessarily creating a denser patent thicket. To revert to the
earlier images, the current patent map contains patents that operate both in series
and in parallel with each other. So the relevant question is whether the new patent
adds a new alternative or simply lengthens an established chain. The latter is odd
because, even with the new patent, businesses are free to use the strategies they
adopted before. On the other side, the arrival of a new patent could allow for an
alternative pathway to production that displaces several patents previously used in
series with each other. It is as though the new patent supplies an interstate highway
for a single toll, supplanting the maze of surface streets previously used. We know
that the rate of patent innovation continues to be strong, which could not be the
case if the thicket were an obstacle to-and not an opportunity for-production.
The Alzheimer's Compound X story that Heller refers to, with all its infirmities,
does not seem to describe the overall state of the industry.
All this is not to say that we do not have instances in which the current
patent law has been misapplied in ways that block technical innovation. Let me
allude to two cases that raise these issues. The first has to do with the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene mutations dealing with breast cancer risk, for which, as Heller
rightly points out, Myriad Genetics holds a single patent that has impeded
scientific research."' The particular complaint is that Myriad's exclusive use of
the patent for the BRCA genes has prevented other companies from using their
(patented) "home-brew" tests for detecting the gene in situ. At present, the attack
on the BRCA was accepted in a lengthy opinion by Judge Robert Sweet in the
Southern District of New York,"t 2 and the matter is now before the Federal Circuit,
with high stakes. Obviously, the problem here is not gridlock, as Heller
acknowledges. What is needed is an explanation why this particular patent
application should be regarded as dubious, even if most gene patents should be
fully protected.
The fuller story goes as follows. As a matter of first principle, it looks as
though the BRCA genes are natural substances that are not patentable as "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas .... ,,13 An exception to that
general rule was developed as early as 1911 in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K.
Mulford Co., in which a Japanese scientist, Jokichi Takamine, had assigned to
Parke-Davis a patent for the isolation and purification of adrenalin. 1 4 No one
doubted that the process whereby the isolation and purification had taken place
was protected. The novel move in Parke-Davis was that Judge Learned Hand
110.
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sustained a patent for the composition of matter, saying: "[W]hile it is of course
possible logically to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every
practical purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically."" 5 In effect, this
decision meant that this patent could not be circumvented by finding some
alternative mode for isolation and purification, which of course increased its value.
There is little doubt that the Hand decision paved the6 way for the development of
the highly valuable recombinant DNA technologies."
The difference between the standard DNA case and the BRCA genes is
that Myriad Genetics has asserted that its patent covers not only the sale of
synthetic BRCA genes, but also the use of that genetic site inside individual
persons. 1 7 This claim creates a complete blockade against new invention because
no one can invent around this patent if the sole objective is to treat the conditions
involving that genetic site. The correct rule is narrower than that adopted by the
District Court in the Myriad Genetics case. Rather than make a frontal assault on
all gene patents, it should limit the Parke-Davis decision to the cases involving
isolation and purification of a product for further sale, which is not at stake here.
The work needed to locate a gene is far less than is needed to first locate and then
synthesize it. The blockade that results from this extended patent coverage is far
too broad. For these limited purposes only, a return to the traditional rule that it is
not possible to patent natural substances seems appropriate.
A second aspect of the full story neglected by Heller is the potential
patentability of gene fragments called "express sequence tags" ("ESTs"), used to
identify and map new genes, which some drug companies sought to patent in
droves. These claims were eventually rejected, and rightly so. 18 To the extent
these ESTs are to be used in situ, the same objections derived in the context of the
BRCA genes apply. For use in the laboratory, the simple approach is that any
identification technique that can work by the boatload should be regarded as an
obvious extension of existing technology that should not be patented. One
interesting side note of the case rejecting the EST patents, In re Fisher, was the
steps taken by Merck, which favored an open access regime to develop its
complementary products. As Heller notes, Merck simply put its ESTs in the public
domain by creating a Gene Index, which took the steam out of the EST
115.
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movement. 1 9 The moral of this tale, however, cuts in favor of strong patent
protection. It is easy for one key player to put something into the public domain. It
is much harder for any company to take something out of the public domain when
the patent laws are weak.
In sum, the legal rules governing the protection of patents are surely
imperfect, and always in need of improvement. However, there is no evidence that
we are in near-crisis mode or that any radical reformation of the law of patents is
required at this time. Furthermore, there is strong reason to believe that the
of patent protection, along a variety of dimensions, is in fact a serious
weakening
20
mistake. 1
CONCLUSION
I believe that this lengthy review of The Gridlock Economy leads to the
following overall evaluation of the work. Gridlock and anticommons are serious
issues that need to be addressed in any comprehensive examination of property
arrangements. But they must also be kept in perspective in at least five ways. First,
many of the serious distortions in the current economy have little or nothing to do
with gridlock. Just the massive programs of government subsidy in the health, real
estate, agricultural, and energy markets are, in aggregate, far greater than the issues
here. Next, in many instances, as in labor and real estate markets, the government
takes an active, if perverse, role in the creation of economic gridlock by offering
legal protection to monopolies (the labor case) or extensive permit powers to
government officials (the real estate case). In labor markets, the second area of
error, a return to competitive structures could be accomplished easily if we had the
will to do it-which we do not. In real estate markets, the third area, massive
simplification of the permit process is possible so long as we are prepared to
reduce the class of externalities that we think call for public action and defer the
granting of remedies until these harms are imminent. Once again, political rather
than intellectual issues are the largest impediments. Fourth, in other markets, most
notably markets in the broadcast spectrum, the true culprit is single government
ownership that can in no way be described as gridlock. And last, the complex
patterns of gridlock that from time to time appear in connection with intellectual
property rights, especially with patents, must be put in perspective. At no point
could these be regarded as the sole source of uneasiness in the pharmaceutical
industry, given the other movements on pricing, liability, and clinical trials that
have impeded drug innovation. Even when the gridlock problem does arise, it is
often a second order issue that pales in significance to the huge boost to investment
that strong property rights create in intellectual property. Thus, the bottom line is
this: private property creates the occasional gridlock, but government ownership
and regulation create far more. Heller should therefore recognize that the second
half of his title does not follow from the first. Indeed, he gets everything
backwards. The correct title is less spectacular but more accurate: The Gridlock
Economy: How Too Much Government Ownership and Regulation Wrecks
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives.
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